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Fiscal policy has received much attention in the literature on taxation and growth.
Numerous theoretical and empirical studies have been devoted to understanding the
growth and welfare effects of various taxes and government expenditures and the
optimal structure of tax systems (e.g., Chamley, 1986; Barro, 1990; Turnovsky, 1996;
Judd, 1997; Guo and Lansing, 1999; and Turnovsky, 2000). Almost all the theoretical
studies in this literature use either neoclassical models or capital-based endogenous
growth models. The majority of these studies show two typical results for optimal
tax structure: first, consumption and leisure are uniformly taxed; second, the steady-
state optimal tax on physical capital income is zero or negative, depending on the
market structure.
However, these papers give little specific implication for technology-leading economies.
In particular, they do not address the questions raised in this thesis: i) is it possible
for the fiscal policy based on consumption taxation, income taxation and government
expenditures to attain social optimum in technology-leading economies; (ii)if not,
what supplemental instruments are needed; (iii) what are the characteristics of the
optimal fiscal policy for technology-leading economies. It is an outstanding fact of
technology-leading economies that economic growth is mainly driven by innovations.
Since capital-based models do not capture this feature, they cannot appropriately
characterize technology-leading economies. As a result, conclusions based on these
models may not hold true for technology-leading economies.
In this thesis, we investigate optimal fiscal policy in a Schumpeterian model of
Howitt and Aghion (1998) that characterizes technology-leading economies. We ex-
tend the original model by endogenizing the labor supply so that optimal fiscal policy
can be studied in a richer set-up. We find that government’s interventions on R&D
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activities (using R&D subsidies or taxes) may be necessary for replicating the first-
best outcome in technology-leading economies. Under plausible parameterization,
however, R&D subsidies are indispensable. Specifically, when the spillover effect is
very small or the monopoly power is very strong, R&D subsidies are needed to reduce
the marginal cost of R&D. This finding is new to our knowledge. It is also consistent
with the observation in the real world that governments usually adopt R&D subsidies
to promote innovation.
In addition, capital investment subsidies are required to help achieve first-best level
of investment and they have to be larger than capital income taxes. The magnitudes
of capital investment subsidies depend positively upon the degree of monopoly power.
The intuition is that capital investment subsidies serve to correct the distortions in
investment caused by monopoly and capital income taxes.
Finally, first-best policy also requires consumption and leisure be taxed uniformly,
which is a well-known result in the literature.
The existence of first-best policy relies on the magnitudes of spillover effect and
R&D productivity parameter, for which the empirical evidence is not available. In
such a case, we then focus on numerical analysis. Simulation results reveal that both
capital investment subsidies and R&D subsidies can help increase welfare even when
the first-best policy is not available.
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1. Introduction
Fiscal policy has received much attention in the literature on taxation and growth.
Numerous theoretical and empirical studies have been devoted to understanding the
growth and welfare effects of various taxes and government expenditures and the
optimal structure of tax systems (e.g., Chamley, 1986; Barro, 1990; Turnovsky, 1996;
Judd, 1997; Guo and Lansing, 1999, Turnovsky, 2000). Almost all the theoretical
studies in this literature use either neoclassical models or capital-based endogenous
growth models.1 The majority of these studies show two typical results for optimal
tax structure: first, consumption and leisure are uniformly taxed; second, the steady-
state optimal tax on physical capital income is zero or negative, depending on the
market structure.
However, these papers give little specific implication for technology-leading economies.
In particular, they do not address the questions raised in this thesis: (i) is it possible
for the fiscal policy based on consumption taxation, income taxation and government
expenditures to attain social optimum in technology-leading economies; (ii)if not,
what supplemental instruments should be included; (iii) what are the characteristics
of the optimal fiscal policy for technology-leading economies. It is an outstanding
fact of technology-leading economies that economic growth is mainly driven by inno-
vations. Since capital-based models do not capture this feature, they cannot appro-
priately characterize technology-leading economies. As a result, conclusions based on
these models may not hold for technology-leading economies.
Within a Schumpeterian framework, Howitt and Aghion (1998) shed a light for
further research on fiscal policy. They introduce capital investment subsidy and R&D
subsidy to examine the effects of government’s intervention on economic growth. In
this thesis, we extend Howitt and Aghion (1998) by considering an important factor
1Zeng and Zhang (2002) study the long-run growth effects of consumption taxes and income taxes
in a non-scale R&D growth model with endogenous saving and labor-leisure choices.
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that has been used in the literature on taxation and growth: the trade-off between
labor and leisure. This extension allows us to study optimal fiscal policy in a richer
set-up. We find that in technology-leading economies the government’s interventions
on R&D activities (using R&D subsidies/taxes) may be necessary for producing first-
best outcome. Under plausible parameterization, however, R&D subsidies are indeed
indispensable. In particular, when the spillover effect is very small or monopoly power
is very strong, R&D subsidies are needed to reduce the marginal cost of R&D so as
to encourage R&D investment. This finding is consistent with the observation in the
real world that governments usually adopt R&D subsidies to promote innovation.
Notably, a firm with a monopoly has more incentive to invest in R&D that will
protect its monopoly than does a new entrant that would become its competitor.
Monopoly firms are usually giants that have plenty of resources and more specific
knowledge of their industries. Thus, they are more likely to succeed in R&D race.
It then follows that R&D sector is in general dominated by monopoly firms. Fur-
thermore, these firms tend to block technology diffusion in order to protect their
monopoly. For those reasons, R&D sector demonstrates strong monopoly power and
small spillover effect. R&D subsidies are thus justified in the real world.
In addition, investment subsidies (we use this term to refer to capital investment
subsidies) are required to help achieve ideal level of investment and it has to be larger
than capital income tax. The magnitude of investment subsidies depend positively
on the degree of monopoly power. In the presence of monopoly power, investment
allocation is always sub-optimal. Accordingly, investment subsidies become necessary
to stimulate capital investment.
Finally, in agreement with the previous work, the first-best tax structure requires
that consumption and leisure be taxed uniformly.
The remainder of this thesis is organized as follows. Chapter 2 reviews the existing
literature. Chapter 3 describes the economic environment and introduces the basic
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framework. Chapter 4 provides the analytical results. It characterizes the decen-
tralized equilibrium and gives solutions for the social planner’s problem. Chapter 5
describes the optimal fiscal policy and provides numerical results. Finally, some con-




One of the most interesting and relevant topics in public finance concerns the op-
timal choice of tax rates. This question has a long history in economics beginning
with the seminal work of Ramsey (1927). In that paper, Ramsey characterizes the
optimal levels for a system of excise taxes on consumption goods. He assumes that
the government’s goal is to choose these taxes to maximize social welfare subject to
the constraints it faces. These constraints are assumed to be of two types. First, a
given amount of revenues is to be raised. Second, Ramsey understands that whatever
tax system the government adopts, consumers and firms in the economy would react
in their own interest through a system of (assumed competitive) markets. This obser-
vation gives rise to a second type of constraint on the behavior of the government-it
must take into account the equilibrium reactions by firms and consumers to the cho-
sen tax policies. Ramsey’s insights have been developed extensively in the last two
decades.
Chamley (1986) analyzes the optimal tax on capital income using a standard
neoclassical growth model in which the government sets the level of its expenditures
exogenously. The population is heterogeneous. Agents have infinite lives and utility
functions which are extensions from the Koopmans form. Chamley (1986) asserts
that when the consumption decisions in a given period have only negligible effect on
the structure of preferences for periods in the distant future, then the second-best tax
rate on capital income converges to zero in the long run. The Chamley analysis do
not consider any externalities from government expenditure.
In a simple model of endogenous growth, Barro (1990) considers tax-financed
government services that affect production or utility and finds that the decentralized
choices of growth and saving are too low. Barro (1990) claims that taxes on wages
and consumption have no effect; they operate like lump-sum taxes.
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The framework of Turnovsky (1996) differs from Chamley (1986) in the following
important respect. By specifying government expenditure as a fraction of output, its
level is no longer exogenous, but instead is proportional to the size of the growing
capital stock. The decision to accumulate capital stock by the private sector leads
to an increase in the supply of public goods in the future. If the private sector
treats government spending as independent of its investment decision, government
expenditure may generate an externality that requires a tax on capital to correct.
Judd (1997) augments the standard growth model to allow for imperfectly com-
petitive product markets. He shows that the steady-state optimal tax on capital
income can be negative. The basic idea is that the government can use tax policy as
a substitute for antitrust policy. In particular, a subsidy to capital income can help
to overcome the classic inefficiency of a monopoly that yields lower long-run levels of
capital and output in comparison to a perfectly competitive economy.
Guo and Lansing (1999) extend the analysis of Judd (1997) by allowing for depre-
ciation of physical capital, a depreciation tax allowance and endogenous government
expenditures. They disaggregate the government’s investment policy into two sepa-
rate components: a capital tax and a depreciation allowance. Their analysis show
that the steady-state optimal tax on capital income can be negative, positive or zero,
depending crucially upon (i) the degree of monopoly power, (ii) the extent to which
monopoly profits can be taxed, (iii) the size of the depreciation allowance and (iv)
the magnitude of government expenditures.
Judd (1999) finds that the optimal long-run tax on capital income is zero even
if the capital stock does not converge to a steady state nor to a steady-state growth
rate. The key assumptions of Judd (1999) are competitive factor markets, a flexible
set of tax policy instruments and the presence of some public goods. According to
Judd (1999), the nature of the optimal tax system in representative agent models do
not depend on the presence of stability of Turnovsky (1996).
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Turnovsky (2000) introduces an elastic labor supply determined by the labor-
leisure tradeoff of agents. The endogeneity of labor supply causes both the consump-
tion and labor income tax to have adverse effects on the growth rate, as does the tax
on capital income. Due to its adverse wealth effect, a lump-sum tax financed increase
in government consumption expenditure in the decentralized economy has a positive
effect on the growth rate. This positive effect on the growth rate contrasts with the
negative effect in the centrally planned economy. Turnovsky (2000) asserts that in
general the optimal tax rates will depend upon the chosen aggregate level of govern-
ment expenditures relative to the optimum. If government expenditures are chosen
optimally, the optimal tax rate on capital income is zero and leisure and consumption
should be taxed uniformly.
The literature has so far focused on capital-based models. It is interesting to fur-
ther explore the issue of optimal fiscal policy in a model with innovation. Our model
is based on Howitt and Aghion (1998) who argue that physical capital accumulation
and innovation are determinants of long-run growth.
Based on the neoclassical growth theory represented by Solow-Swan model, most
economists agree that although both capital accumulation and technological progress
contribute to economic growth, only technological progress plays a vital role in the
long-run. Capital accumulation only affects the level of output but not the growth
rate. For example, Romer(1990), Grossman and Helpman (1991), and Blanchard
(1997) assert that the incentive for innovation determines the rate of technological
progress, which in turn determines the long-run growth rate, independent of the
amount of physical capital. In contrast, Howitt and Aghion (1998) argue that physical
capital accumulation and technological progress are in general complementary and
both of them play critical roles in long-run economic growth. The intuition is that
R&D requires a great deal of physical capital in the forms of buildings, computers,
laboratories and other research facilities. Thus, physical capital is a significant input
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to R&D and a subsidy to capital accumulation will increase R&D intensity and in
turn enhance economic growth.
Howitt and Aghion (1998) examine economic growth through the channel of ob-
solescence (or the improvement of product quality) that has received little attention
in the literature on endogenous growth. The economic intuition behind the obsoles-
cence is that improved version of products render the previous ones out-of-fashion.
In Howitt and Aghion (1998), the arrival of innovation is governed by a Poisson dis-
tribution. The amount of research in any period depends negatively on the expected
amount of research in the next period. The reason is that successful R&D brings new
technology and destroys the profits of previous innovation. Since the profits from
innovation are temporary, the expectation of more research in the next period will
discourage R&D activities in the current period.
Howitt and Aghion (1998) also provide some perspectives for further research on
fiscal policy. They introduce two elements into the model: capital investment subsidy
and R&D subsidy to examine the effects of government’s intervention on economic
growth. They show that growth rate depends positively on the two subsidy rates
and the size of innovations but negatively on the elasticity of marginal utility, the
rate of time preference and the rate of depreciation. They indicate that an increase
in the subsidy rate on capital investment will enhance R&D intensity by raising
capital accumulation, which in turn contribute to the long-run growth. However,
contrary to the argument of neoclassical growth theory and other endogenous growth
theories, a subsidy on capital accumulation, either physical or human capital, will
have a permanent effect on growth rate. The policy implication of their result is
that investment subsidy may be as effective as R&D subsidy to stimulate growth.
Therefore, government may choose to subsidize capital investment to help growth
since it is difficult to subsidize R&D directly and practically.
In this thesis, we extend the model of Howitt and Aghion (1998) by endogenizing
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labor supply to investigate optimal fiscal policy. Capturing the essential aspects of
technology-leading economies, this extension is useful in providing policy implications.
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3. The Model
The basic framework is due to Howitt and Aghion (1998). We extend the model by
considering the trade-off between labor and leisure. We consider a closed economy
populated with Lt identical infinitely-lived individuals at time t. Assume that popu-
lation is constant over time (Lt = L, ∀t). The representative agent is endowed with a
unit of time that can be allocated either to leisure, lt, or to work, vt(= 1− lt). In this
extended model, labor supply is determined by intertemporal utility maximization of
a representative agent as in the literature on taxation vs. growth. There are four
types of production activities in this economy: final good production, intermediate
good production, physical capital accumulation and R&D. It is assumed that per-
fect competition prevails in all sectors except the intermediate good sectors where
temporary monopoly power exists.
3.1. Final Good Production
There is a single final good which can be interchangeably used as a consumption
or capital good or as an input to R&D. The final good is produced by labor and a








1−αdi, vt + lt = 1, 0 < α < 1, 0 < β < 1 (1)
where Yt is the output of final good production at date t, Gpt the flow of services
from government spending on the economy’s infrastructure (we follow Turnovsky
(2000) to assume that Gpt is a pure public good.), xit the flow of intermediate good
i ∈ [0, 1] used in the final good production, Ait the productivity parameter attached
with the latest version of intermediate goods i, At ≡
∫ 1
0
Aitdi the average produc-
tivity parameter across all intermediate good sectors, α a parameter that measures
the contribution of an intermediate good to the final good production and inversely
measures the intermediate monopolist’s market power, β a parameter that measures
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the contribution of public good (deflated by the average productivity parameter At)
to the final good production, vt the fraction of time allocated to work. In addition, we
assume that government claims a fraction, gp, of aggregate output, Yt, for expenditure
on infrastructure, in accordance with Gpt = gpYt.













where pit is the price of intermediate good i and wt is wage rate. Note that the final






1−α, ∀i ∈ [0, 1], (3)






These two conditions give the final good producer’s demand for intermediate goods
and labor. Note that as usual the quantities demanded of both intermediate goods
and labor are negatively related to their respective prices pit and wt.
3.2. Intermediate Good Production
Each intermediate good i is produced using only capital Kit as its input. The technol-
ogy for intermediate good production is given by xit = Kit/Ait. In this specification,
the capital input is deflated by the productivity parameter Ait to reflect the fact that
more recent innovations are more capital intensive. Given the interest rate rt and the
final good producer’s demand for the intermediate good (3), each intermediate good
producer chooses its output xit to maximize its monopoly profits
piit = pitxit − rtKit = α(Gpt/At)βAitxαit(vtL)1−α − rtAitxit. (5)
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1−α − rtAit = 0, or α2xα−1it (vtL)1−α − rt = 0. (6)
From (6), we can see that all intermediate good producers will produce the same
amount of output, i.e., xit = xt, ∀i ∈ [0, 1], because each producer’s marginal rev-
enue and marginal cost are proportional to its productivity parameter Ait. Since





Aitxitdi = Atxt = Kt, where Kt is the total capital stock, we have
xt = Kt/At = ktvtL, (7)
where kt ≡ Kt/(AtvtL) is the productivity-adjusted capital/labor ratio. Then equa-













Note that both the optimal price and the maximum profits are proportional to the
productivity parameter Ait.
3.3. R&D
Following Howitt and Aghion (1998), we assume that R&D takes the form of vertical
innovations. Innovations are targeted at specific intermediate goods. Each innovation
creates an improved version of the existing goods, replaces the existing one in final
good production and produces final good more efficiently than before. R&D firms are
motivated by the prospect of monopoly rents that can be captured when a successful
innovation is patented. The successful innovator becomes the temporary monopolist
until the arrival of the next innovation in that sector. R&D activities use final good
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as the only hired input. Suppose that innovations follow a Poisson process with
the arrival rate φt = λnt, where λ(> 0) is a parameter indicating the productivity of
R&D and nt is the productivity-adjusted quantity of final good devoted to R&D. R&D
expenditure (in terms of final good) is Amaxt nt, where A
max
t ≡ max{Ait|i ∈ [0, 1]} is
the productivity parameter of the leading-edge technology. The R&D expenditure
increases with the leading-edge productivity parameter because innovation becomes
increasingly complex as technology advances. Since the expected return on R&D
investment is the same in each intermediate good sector, the amount of expenditure
on R&D is also the same in each intermediate good sector. R&D firm chooses its
input nt to maximize its expected profits: λntVt − (1 − sn)Atmaxnt, where Vit is the
expected value of a successful innovation and sn the R&D subsidy/tax. The first-order
conditions for this maximization problem are
λVt ≤ (1− sn)Atmax, nt ≥ 0, nt[λVt − (1− sn)Atmax] = 0, (10)
where the value of a successful innovation Vt is given by the expected discounted






φz)dz]pitsds, where s and z refer to time, rz is the instantaneous rate of interest, φz is
the rate of creative destruction (i.e., the instantaneous probability of being replaced





Amaxt rsksvsL is the profit flow to R&D firm.















= 1− sn, (12)
which equalizes the expected marginal benefit (the left-hand side) and the marginal
cost (the right-hand side) of R&D to determine the optimal investment in R&D.
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3.4. Knowledge Spillover and Capital Accumulation
Following Caballero and Jaffe (1993), Aghion and Howitt (1998) and Zeng and Zhang
(2002), we assume that growth in the leading-edge productivity At
max results from
knowledge spillover of vertical innovations. More specifically, the leading-edge pro-
ductivity At
max is assumed to grow at a rate proportionally to the aggregate rate of
innovations λnt; and the factor of this proportionality is assumed equal to σ(> 0),
which measures the marginal impact of the innovation to the stock of public knowl-
edge. Since the aggregate flow of vertical innovations equals the number of interme-
diate sectors, which is normalized to one, times the number of vertical innovations in
each sector λnt, the growth rate of leading-edge productivity is
A˙maxt /At
max = σλnt. (13)
A dot on a variable represents the time change rate of that variable. As shown in
Howitt and Aghion (1998), the ratio of leading-edge productivity Amaxt to the average
productivity At converges monotonically to the constant 1 + σ. Thus, it is assumed





Final output is allocated among aggregate consumption (Ct), physical capital
accumulation (K˙t), government expenditures on consumption and production (Gct
and Gpt, respectively) and R&D inputs (At
maxnt). The market clearing condition for
the final good gives the law of motion for capital stock
K˙t = Yt − Ct −Gct −Gpt − Atmaxnt, (14)
where we abstract from capital depreciation for simplicity.
3.5. Government
We assume that the government has access to distortionary taxes and subsidies (both
at flat rates): a capital income tax τk, a labor income tax τw, a consumption tax τc,
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a capital investment subsidy sk and a R&D subsidy sn. We also assume that the
lump-sum tax, Tt, is tied to aggregate output, Yt, according to Tt = gTYt.
Further assuming that the government’s budget balances at each point in time,
then we have the government’s budget constraint
τkrtKt + τwwtvtL+ τcCt + Tt = Gct +Gpt + skK˙t + snAt
maxnt. (15)
In (15), the left-hand side is the government’s tax revenue from capital income
(τkrtKt), labor income (τwwtvtL), consumption (τcCt) and lump-sum tax (Tt). And
the right-hand side is government’s expenditures on consumption (Gct) and infras-
















ρ > 0, η > 0, θ > 0, −∞ < γ ≤ 1, γ(1 + η) < 1, γ(1 + η + θ) < 1, (16)
where c¯t ≡ Ct/L is per capita private consumption; lt is the fraction of time allocated
to leisure; Gct is the consumption services of a government-provided consumption
good; ρ is the constant rate of time preference; γ is a parameter related to the
intertemporal elasticity of substitution (χ say, by χ = 1/(1 − γ)), which requires
−∞ < γ ≤ 1; θ and η are parameters that respectively measure the importance
of leisure and public consumption relative to private consumption. We assume that
both leisure and public consumption provide the agent with positive marginal utility,
which implies η > 0 and θ > 0. The constraints γ(1 + η) < 1 and γ(1 + η + θ) < 1
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are required to ensure that the utility function is concave in c¯t, lt and Gct.
2
We further assume that the government claims a fraction, gc, of output for public
consumption, i.e., Gct = gcYt. Given the public consumption goods provided by the
government, the representative agent chooses his consumption c¯t and leisure lt to
maximize his life-time discounted utility (16) subject to the following budget and
time constraints
(1− sk) ˙¯kt = (1− τw)wtvt+(1− τk)rtk¯t− (1+ τc)c¯t−T t (budget constraint), (17)
vt + lt = 1 (time constraint), (18)
where k¯t ≡ Kt/L is per capita capital asset; T t ≡ Tt/L is per capita lump-sum tax.






1− γ(1 + η)
[
rt(1− τk)
1− sk − ρ
]
, (19)







In (19), the capital-income tax has a direct negative effect on consumption growth
by reducing the after-tax rate of return to capital, while all taxes may affect con-
sumption growth through the interest rate. In (20), a lower labor-income tax, or a
lower consumption tax, tends to raise consumption relative to leisure by raising the
after-tax wage, or by lowering the price of consumption.
2As noted in Turnovsky (2000), the utility function (16) satisfies the functional form identified
by Ladro´n-de-Guevara et al. (1997) for which the introduction of leisure will be consistent with a
balanced growth equilibrium.
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4. Equilibrium and Results
We consider only steady-state growth equilibria. The steady-state values of the inter-
est rate rt, R&D intensity nt, capital intensity kt and the proportion of time allocated
to work vt are all constant; and the aggregate output Yt, capital stock Kt, private
consumption Ct, public consumption Gct, the average productivity At, the leading-
edge productivity Amaxt and the wage rate wt all grow at the same constant rate ψ.
More formally, a steady-state balanced growth equilibrium is a collection of constant
values (r, n, v, k) and a constant growth rate ψ for {Yt, Kt, Ct, Gct, At, Amaxt , wt}
such that (i) each individual maximizes his lifetime utility by allocating his time be-
tween leisure and production and his income between consumption and saving; (ii)
each (final good, intermediate good, and R&D) firm maximizes its profits; (iii) all the
markets clear; and (iv) the government budget balances.
For notional simplicity, we define the quantity Γ ≡ 1−α+α2−gc−gp−α(1−α)(1+σ)sn1−sn .
Carrying out the optimization for the consumer and aggregating over the L identical































































and which now determine the equilibrium values of: the fraction of time devoted to
work, vt, the consumption-output ratio, (Ct/Yt), the output-capital ratio, (Yt/Kt),
the quantity of intermediate goods, (Kt/At), and the steady-state growth rate, ψt.
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(21) describes the intratemporal optimality condition between consumption and
leisure. It asserts that the marginal rate of substitution between labor and therefore
output, and consumption equals the relative price of output in terms of consumption.
(22) is the Euler equation which equates the social marginal return to capital to the
rate of return on consumption. (23) is the aggregate resource constraint per unit of
capital. (24) simply states the fact that at the equilibrium output and leading-edge
productivity grow at the same rate. Finally, (25) restates the production function.
To avoid obscuring the main focus of the paper, we consider only unique equi-
librium. Before proceeding to describe the results, we identify the conditions that
guarantee a unique steady-state growth equilibrium.
Proposition 1. A unique steady-state growth equilibrium exists provided that the
following conditions are met.
(1− β)[1− γ(1 + η)]
θα2
>
(1 + τc)(1− τk)




σ(1− β)[1− γ(1 + η)](1− sk)
1− τk + (1− α− β)
}
− σα2

























> 1− α+ α2 − gc − gp (28)
If we interpret the term 1−τk
1−sk as the net subsidy on capital income and the term
1−τw
1+τc
as the net tax on labor income, then (26) says that the ratio of net subsidy on
capital income to net tax on labor income should be upper-bounded. In other words,
capital cannot be overly subsidized.
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σ(1− β)[1− γ(1 + η)](1− sk)





α(1− α)(1 + σ)
> 0
Therefore, (27) imposes a restriction on the magnitude of sn. If sn < 0 (i.e., R&D
taxes), (27) will be readily satisfied. If sn > 0, the right-hand side of (27), which has
to be upper-bounded, is simply the ratio of R&D subsidy per unit to R&D cost per
unit. This requires that R&D not be excessively subsidized.
(28) is to rule out the possibility of no growth. Recall that (23) is the aggregate
resource constraint per unit of capital. Hence, (28) can be rewritten as
































is the consumption-output ratio when the growth rate is zero. Then (28) says that
the aggregate resource constraint will be violated if there is no growth.
Under Proposition 1, the equilibrium values of (Yt/Kt), (Kt/At), (Ct/Yt), vt and









































































where f(ψ) ≡ (1−sk){ρ+[1−γ(1+η)]ψ}
α2(1−τk) .
In the next chapter, we will carry on welfare analysis for the decentralized economy.
To provide a benchmark, we also give the social planner’s solution next.
Social Planner’s Problem
At each point in time, social planner sets production plan for every producer.
Specifically, social planner chooses xit to maximize the quantity of final good sub-
ject to the resource constraint,
∫ 1
0
Aitxitdi = Kt. The first order condition for this




α−1 . Note that this quantity is in-
dependent of i. Hence, each intermediate good producer in the centrally planned
economy supplies the same quantity of intermediate good xit = xt = Kt/At.
The social planner chooses (Ct, Gct, Gpt, Kt, nt, vt) to maximize the representative
agent’s utility described by Eq.(16) subject to the following resource and technology
constraints
K˙t = (1− gc − gp)Yt − Ct − (1 + σ)Atnt (resource constraint) (34)
A˙t/At = σλnt (technology constraint) (35)
































































where h(ψ˜) ≡ ρ+[1−γ(1+η)]ψ˜
α
.
In the centrally planned economy, one can show that a unique balanced growth















which would plausibly be met given the empirical evidence suggesting that γ < 0.
Compared with decentralized equilibrium, the parallels between equations (29)-(32)
and equations (36)-(39) are clear. The main difference is that in the decentralized
economy the agent takes the policy of government as given and responds to tax
incentives. It should be noted that the shape of the agent’s preference function is
identical to that in Turnovsky (2000). As a consequence, the effects of social planner’s
policy on the equilibrium are the same as obtained by Turnovsky (2000).
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5. Optimal Fiscal Policy
In this chapter, we address the question of optimal fiscal policy and consider the extent
to which the policy maker in the decentralized economy is able to set expenditure
and tax rates so that the equilibrium in that economy, described by equations (29)-
(33), replicates the first-best outcome obtained by the social planner, described by
equations (36)-(40).
First-best fiscal policy
The government chooses (gc, gp, τc, τw, τk, sn) to maximize the representative
agent’s welfare (16). Here both gT ≥ 0 and sk ≥ 0 are treated as exogenously given.
This treatment has no essential effect on our analysis of optimal fiscal policy. The
first-best fiscal policy is given by
Proposition 2. Let F (g∗c ) ≡ ρη(1 − β){α(1 + η){γη(1 − β) + [1 − γ(1 + η)]g∗c}}−1



















then there exists a unique g∗c ∈ (0, δ1) that supports the first best fiscal policy which
is: g∗p = β, τ
∗



















α(1− α)(1 + σ)
(1− α− β){1 + σα− (1 + η)g∗c/[η(1− β)]}
(45)
τ ∗c = −τ ∗w =
(1− s∗k)
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The optimal government expenditures are derived from maximizing the current-
value Hamiltonian in the Appendix A.2. with respect to gc and gp. The optimal
taxation arises from equalizing the decentralized solutions and social planner’s solu-
tions by choosing the tax and subsidy rates as well as the shares of output devoted
to public consumption and infrastructure. Note that sn can be either positive or
negative. In cases that it is negative, sn can be explained as R&D taxes. Note also
that the first-best scheme at τk = 0 is equivalent to schemes at τk > 0 so long as the
rules specified above are met.
Our findings for the first-best tax scheme are at odds with Turnovsky (2000)
in two aspects. First, R&D subsidies/taxes may be necessary for sustaining first-
best outcome. The government’s intervention on R&D is justified by the two effects
associated with R&D, namely, ‘appropriability effect’ and ‘business-stealing effect’.
‘Appropriability effect’, which reflects the private monopolists’ inability to appropri-
ate the whole output flow (he or she can appropriate only a fraction (1− α) of that
output), tends to generate too little research under laissez-faire and too low a growth
rate. ‘Business-stealing effect’, which arises from the failure of private research firm
to internalize the loss to the previous monopolist caused by an innovation, will tend
to generate too much research under laissez-faire and thus too high a growth rate. In
contrast, the social planner takes into account that an innovation destroys the social
return from the previous innovation.
Second, the first-best tax structure in Turnovsky (2000) is characterized by a zero
tax on capital income. In our model, however, mere a zero tax on capital income
is not enough. To replicate first-best outcome, it requires capital investment be
subsidized. This is due to the presence of monopoly power in intermediate-good
sectors. With monopoly power in intermediate-good sectors, investment allocation
is always sub-optimal. Hence investment subsidies are called for to the extent that
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an ideal level of investment is met. In order for investment subsidies to correct tax
distortions in addition to monopoly distortions, they must be greater than the tax on
capital income. In particular, the subsidies on capital investment depend positively
on the monopoly power in intermediate-good sectors (i.e., sk becomes larger when α
is smaller).
In agreement with Turnovsky (2000), the optimal tax structure also requires that
consumption and leisure be taxed uniformly. A special case here is to set sk = 1− α
on capital investment and a zero tax on capital income, and to tax consumption and
leisure equally.
The government’s intervention on R&D, represented by sn, is a key difference
between our model and previous work. It is therefore of interest to identify the
parameters that govern the sign of sn.
Proposition 3. Let δ2 ≡ η(1− β)(1 + η)−1[1 + σα− α(1− α)(1 + σ)(1− α− β)−1].
If δ1 < δ2, s
∗
n > 0. If δ1 > δ2, s
∗



















If δ1 < δ2, there have to be subsidies on R&D. Since δ2 is decreasing in σ and α,
the inequality δ1 < δ2 would be satisfied if σ and/or α are/is very small. Therefore,
R&D subsidies are necessary if the spillover effect is very small or monopoly power
is very strong. The economic intuition is as follows. (i) Too small spillover effect
leads to a sub-optimal growth rate and too low welfare. By subsidizing R&D, the
government reduce the marginal cost of R&D (the right-hand side of (12)). This
gives R&D firms the incentive to increase R&D intensity nt until the marginal cost
and marginal gain (the left-hand side of (12)) are equalized. (ii) As α is very small
(indicating very strong monopoly power), so are the monopoly profits, and so is the
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expected marginal gain of R&D. Hence, R&D subsidies are called for to reduce the
marginal cost of R&D to the extent that marginal cost equals expected marginal gain.
If δ1 > δ2, the sign of sn depends crucially upon (i) the magnitude of knowledge
spillover σ and (ii) the magnitude of the productivity parameter λ. R&D taxes (i.e.
sn < 0) become relevant if σ and/or λ are/is too large. σ affects the sign of sn in the
same way as described for the case δ1 < δ2. The parameter of R&D productivity λ
has two-fold effects on social welfare. Notice that the R&D productivity parameter
λ enters both the numerator and denominator of the left-hand side of (12). On
one hand, a rise in λ increases the rate of creative destruction λnt. A high rate of
creative destruction discourages R&D because current technology will be more easily
superseded when the rate of creative destruction is high. On the other hand, it raises
the profit flow pits to R&D firm, thereby increasing the incentive to make innovation.
As a result, a rise in R&D productivity can both decrease and increase the marginal
gain of R&D. Here it is clear that the latter effect dominates. Accordingly, too large
λ calls for R&D taxes to avoid too much R&D. In addition, the effect of monopoly
power 1/α on the sign of sn is quite ambiguous.
For the parameters of our benchmark economy, i.e. α = 0.3, β = 0.08, η = 0.3, γ =
−1, σ = 0.1, the inequality δ1 < δ2 will be met. Hence, R&D subsidies are always
relevant for our benchmark economy. Note that except the value of σ which is chosen
arbitrarily, the other parameters values are representative of the U.S. economy. This
is consistent with the observation in the real world that the governments usually
choose to subsidize R&D.
The existence of first-best scheme is contingent upon conditions (42) and (43).
Given empirical evidence suggesting that γ < 0, (42) would plausibly be met. How-
ever, (43) is hard to verify since it includes the knowledge spillover σ as well as the







is not defined everywhere for (α, β) ∈ (0, 1) × (0, 1) if γ < 0. In
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this kind of situation, the focus should then be placed on second-best policy.
Second-best fiscal policy
The second-best fiscal policy is derived from maximizing economic welfare subject
to the government budget constraint. Economic welfare is the optimized utility of




γ[ρ− γ(1 + η)ψ] (48)
after normalizing the population and initial capital stock (L and K0, respectively) to
one.
Given that explicit solutions cannot be derived in this case, numerical analysis are
helpful in highlighting the welfare effects of fiscal policy. We begin by characterizing
a benchmark economy, by calibrating the model using the following parameters: α =
0.3, β = 0.08, γ = −1, ρ = 0.05, θ = 0.3, η = 0.3, λ = 0.5, σ = 0.1, gc = 0.14, gp =
0.08, gT = 0. Except λ and σ which we choose arbitrarily, the other parameters’ values
are representative of the U.S. economy. In the United States, the historical average
of the total fraction of net national production devoted to government expenditure
on goods and services equals 0.22. That is why we choose gc + gp = 0.22. Following
Turnovsky (2000), the breakdown point is chosen at gc = 0.14 and gp = 0.08.
Table 1 reports the simulation results for the general case. Across the columns,
we give the values of the different tax rates and subsidy rates. We begin with the case
without investment subsidies and R&D subsidies, in which we compare the welfare
effects of consumption taxation, labor-income taxation and capital-income taxation.
First, if the government choose only one kind of taxation to collect revenue, then
consumption taxation is better than income taxation from welfare perspective. This
finding is compatible with the existing literature. Second, if the government impose
the same tax rate on labor income and capital income, then transforming income
taxation toward consumption taxation can be welfare reducing. This finding is in
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line with Davies et al. (2002). Davies et al. (2002) show that a tax mix similar
to US practice is better than consumption alone once investment subsidies are al-
lowed. Through our simulation we can see that if labor income taxation and capital
income taxation are chosen equally, a transition from income taxation to consumption
taxation will be welfare reducing even without investment subsidies.
Next, we set τw = τk = 0.25, which is close to the income tax rates in the United
States. Under this setting, we observe that an increase in the subsidy rates on capital
investment and R&D can improve welfare marginally. Hence, even if it is impossible
to implement first-best policy, we are still able to use investment subsidies and R&D
subsidies to improve welfare.
Table 2 reports simulation results as the values of α and σ vary. To compare with
the results in Table 1, we set τw = τk = 0.25. We can see that investment subsidies
and R&D subsidies increase as α falls. A small α corresponds to strong monopoly
power in intermediate-good sector. Strong monopoly power requires larger capital
subsidy to reduce the distortions in capital investment. Since a decline in α depresses
the accumulated profit of R&D, the government need to raise R&D subsidies to
stimulate R&D expenditure. On the other hand, as σ rises, the government need to
reduce R&D subsidies. The economic intuition is as follows. When the spillover effect
is too large, the government need to decrease R&D subsidies to reduce the incentive
for R&D investment. Therefore, the simulation results confirm our findings for the
welfare effects of investment subsidies and R&D subsidies.
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6. Conclusions
In this thesis, we use Schumpeterian growth model with endogenous labor supply to
investigate optimal fiscal policy. We show that investment subsidies and R&D subsi-
dies play important roles in the optimal fiscal policy for technology-leading economies.
Our findings for the first-best fiscal policy are summarized as follows. First of
all, the first-best tax structure requires consumption and leisure be taxed uniformly.
Leisure can be deemed as a kind of consumption good. At the optimum, any two
consumption goods have to be taxed equally.
Second, investment subsidies, which positively depend on the degree of monopoly
power, are required in the first-best policy. Furthermore, investment subsidies must be
greater than capital-income tax. The economic intuition is that in order for the social
welfare to be first best, the distortions in capital investment caused by monopoly and
capital-income tax require investment subsidies to correct.
Finally, the government’s R&D policy in terms of R&D subsidies/taxes may be
necessary for replicating the first-best outcome. More specifically, when the spillover
effect is very small or monopoly power is very strong, R&D subsidies can help increase
welfare by reducing the marginal cost of R&D and maintaining the optimal level of
R&D input. When the size of innovation is very large or the R&D productivity is very
high, R&D taxes are required to prevent too much R&D investment. Nevertheless,
under plausible parameterization, only R&D subsidies are relevant for first-best policy.
This is consistent with empirical evidence.
The first result is well-known in the literature. The second result is consistent
with Guo and Lansing (1999). If tax on capital income is allowed to be negative
in our model, we can also have negative, positive or zero optimal tax on capital
income when the magnitude of investment subsidy varies. A negative tax is in fact
a subsidy. In that sense, our second finding parallels Guo and Lansing (1999). This
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result is, however, different from Turnovsky (2000) in which product markets are
perfectly competitive. The third finding is new to our knowledge. Although Howitt
and Aghion (1998) examined the growth effects of investment subsidies and R&D
subsidies, the welfare effects of R&D subsidies remain unaddressed. In that sense,
our results complement those in the existing literature.
Given that the existence of first-best policy is hard to verify, we then focus on
numerical analysis of the welfare effects of investment subsidies and R&D subsidies.
Simulation results reveal that both investment subsidies and R&D subsidies can help
increase welfare even when the first-best policy is unavailable. Thus, the implication
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Appendices
A.1. Proof of the convergence of Amaxt to At(1 + σ).
Defining Θ ≡ Amaxt /At. Taking the logarithm of both sides and then differentiating

















= φtσ−φt(Θ−1) = φt(1+σ−Θ)
In the long run, the growth rate of Θ should be equal to zero to achieve a stable
equilibrium, therefore we have φt(1+σ−Θ) = 0. Since φt is always positive, we must




t = A˙t/At = g.
A.2. The optimality conditions for decentralized economy











1− sk [(1− τw)wt(1− lt) + (1− τk)rtk¯t− (1 + τc)c¯t− T t] (49)








γ − Λt(1 + τc)













1− sk = ρΛt − Λ˙t, (52)
lim
t→∞
e−ρtΛtk¯t = 0, (53)
(17) and (18), where (53) is a transversality condition. From the above first-order
conditions, we obtain the optimal path of (per capita) private consumption (19) and
the relationship between leisure and consumption (20).
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A.3. Derivation of Proposition 1
Let Ω(ψ) represent the right hand side of Eq.(33). Differentiating Ω(ψ) with respect

















(1− β)[1− γ(1 + η)] + ρ(1− α− β)
ψ + σα2f(ψ)
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∂Ω/∂ψ > 1 if the sum of the first two terms is greater than 1. Using the fact



























(1− β)[1− γ(1 + η)] + ρ(1− α− β)
ψ + σα2f(ψ)
}






(1− τk)[ψ + σα2f(ψ)]
>
(1− τw)(1− sk)
θα2(1 + τc)(1− τk)
{
(1− β)[1− γ(1 + η)] + ρ(1− α− β)
ψ + σα2f(ψ)
}






(1− τk)[ψ + σα2f(ψ)]
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Next we want to derive the conditions for the inequality below to hold.
(1− τw)(1− sk)
θα2(1 + τc)(1− τk)
{
(1− β)[1− γ(1 + η)] + ρ(1− α− β)
ψ + σα2f(ψ)
}






(1− τk)[ψ + σα2f(ψ)]
> 1




(1− β)[1− γ(1 + η)]− θα


















Under (26), the left-hand side of inequality (54) is increasing in ψ. Hence, it will be
true for any ψ if it is true at ψ = 0. At ψ = 0, inequality (54) holds if condition
(27) holds. Under (28), Ω(ψ) < 0 at ψ = 0. Since the left-hand side of (33) is the
45 degree line, (26), (27) and (28) jointly ensure the existence of a unique positive
solution for ψ.
A.4. The optimality conditions for social planner’s problem




























γY ηγ−1t + ξK(1− gc − gp)− ξY = 0, (56)
∂H
∂nt
































1−β + [ξAσλ− ξK(1 + σ)]nt
= ρξA − ξ˙A (60)
lim
t→∞
e−ρtξKKt = 0, (61)
(1), (34) and (35), where (61) is a transversality condition.
A.5. Derivation of Proposition 2
The growth rate in the decentralized economy will coincide with that in the centrally

























When government expenditure is set optimally, i.e., gc = g
∗
c , gp = g
∗
p, (62) and (63)
reduce to
α(1− τ ∗k )
(1− s∗k)
= 1; τ ∗c = −τ ∗w (64)




(1− sn){ρσα + {1 + σα[1− γ(1 + η)]}ψ}
σλα{ρ+ [1− γ(1 + η)]ψ} =
α(1 + σ)
σλ(1− α− β) (65)
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Also note that the first-best policy structure should be consistent with government
budget constraint (15). We treat g∗T and s
∗
k as exogenously given. By equalizing
decentralized solutions and social planner’s solutions, we have the following equations

























α(1− α)(1 + σ)
(1− α− β){1 + σα− (1 + η)g∗c/[η(1− β)]}
(67)
τ ∗c = −τ ∗w =
(1− s∗k)
[










where F (g∗c ) is defined in Proposition 2.


















For convenience, we define the left-hand side of (66) as LHS and its right-hand side
as RHS. We also define δ1 ≡ −γη(1− β)/[1− γ(1 + η)]. Note that δ1 ∈ (0, 1).














k) exists if there is a unique g
∗
c ∈
(0, 1). To do so, it suffices to show that there exists a unique g∗c ∈ (0, δ1) that
supports the first-best policy.
To ensure a feasible s∗n(i.e. s
∗
n < 1) requires g
∗
c < η(1− β)(1 + σα)/(1 + η). This
can be readily satisfied for ∀gc ∈ (0, δ1) since we can verify that δ1 < η(1 − β)(1 +




−ρη(1− β)[1− γ(1 + η)]



















Since ∂F/∂g∗c < 0 and F (0) = ρ/[αγ(1 + η)] < 0, we have F (gc) < 0 for ∀gc ∈ (0, δ1).
Recall inequality (69) which implies {ρ/[αγ(1 + η)]} β−11−α > 0, we have F (gc)
β−1
1−α > 0
for any ∀gc ∈ (0, δ1). Hence, ∂RHS/∂gc < 0 for ∀gc ∈ (0, δ1). Therefore, under
inequalities (68) and (69), RHS is continuous and monotonically decreasing in gc
and RHS > 0 at gc = 0 . Furthermore, limgc→δ1 RHS = −η(1 − α)/θ < 0. Since
LHS is the 45 degree line, it follows that a unique solution for g∗c exists.
A.6. Derivation of Proposition 3
From (67), s∗n T 0 if g∗c S δ2 where δ2 ≡ η(1−β)(1+η)−1[1+σα−α(1−α)(1+σ)(1−
α− β)−1]. Hence, it follows that s∗n > 0 if δ1 < δ2. If δ1 > δ2, given the monotonicity
of RHS, a positive solution for s∗n exists if RHS < 1 at gc = δ2. Likewise, a negative
solution for s∗n exists if and only if RHS > 1 at gc = δ2. s
∗
n = 0 is also a possibility if
RHS = 1 at gc = δ2.
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Table 1
Comparisons among different tax mix
Parameters: α = 0.3, β = 0.08, γ = −1, ρ = 0.05, θ = 0.3, η = 0.3
λ = 0.5, σ = 0.1, gc = 0.14, gp = 0.08, gT = 0
Case 1: sk = sn = 0
Schemes τc τw τk sk sn welfare
τc only 0.314 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 -191.0
τw only 0.000 0.388 0.000 0.000 0.000 -192.5
τk only 0.000 0.000 0.413 0.000 0.000 -193.3
τw and τk 0.000 0.194 0.937 0.000 0.000 -200.2
Case 2: τw = τk 6= 0, sk = sn = 0
Schemes τc τw τk sk sn welfare
Tax mix 1 0.318 0.050 0.050 0.000 0.000 −182.3
Tax mix 2 0.248 0.100 0.100 0.000 0.000 −172.3
Tax mix 3 0.178 0.150 0.150 0.000 0.000 −162.3
Tax mix 4 0.109 0.200 0.200 0.000 0.000 −152.4
Tax mix 5 0.039 0.250 0.250 0.000 0.000 −142.7
Case 3:sk 6= 0, sn = 0, τk = τw = 0.25
Schemes τc τw τk sk sn welfare
Tax mix 1 0.03945 0.250 0.250 0.010 0.000 −142.5351
Tax mix 2 0.03947 0.250 0.250 0.020 0.000 −142.5257
Tax mix 3 0.03948 0.250 0.250 0.030 0.000 −142.5241
Tax mix 4 0.03950 0.250 0.250 0.040 0.000 −142.5218
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Case 4: sk = 0, sn 6= 0, τw = τk = 0.25
Schemes τc τw τk sk sn welfare
Tax mix 1 0.03943 0.25 0.25 0.000 0.050 -141.3107
Tax mix 2 0.04038 0.25 0.25 0.000 0.100 -140.1152
Tax mix 3 0.04246 0.25 0.25 0.000 0.150 -139.1350
Tax mix 4 0.04595 0.25 0.25 0.000 0.200 -138.4145
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Table 2
Comparisons among different solutions
Case 1: β = 0.08, γ = −1, ρ = 0.05, θ = 0.3, η = 0.3
λ = 0.5, σ = 0.1, gc = 0.14, gp = 0.08, gT = 0, τw = τk = 0.25, sn = 0
α τc τw τk sk sn welfare
0.20 0.03948 0.250 0.250 0.0115 0.000 -142.5391
0.25 0.03946 0.250 0.250 0.0107 0.000 -142.5369
0.35 0.03942 0.250 0.250 0.0101 0.000 -142.5337
0.40 0.03937 0.250 0.250 0.0964 0.000 -142.5311
Case 2: β = 0.08, γ = −1, ρ = 0.05, θ = 0.3, η = 0.3
λ = 0.5, σ = 0.1,gc = 0.14, gp = 0.08, gT = 0, τw = τk = 0.25, sk = 0
α τc τw τk sk sn welfare
0.20 0.03981 0.250 0.250 0.000 0.077 -142.9241
0.25 0.03956 0.250 0.250 0.000 0.063 -142.1377
0.35 0.03906 0.250 0.250 0.000 0.037 -140.6415
0.40 0.03883 0.250 0.250 0.000 0.025 -139.8517
Case 3: α = 0.3, β = 0.08, γ = −1, ρ = 0.05, θ = 0.3, η = 0.3
λ = 0.5, gc = 0.14, gp = 0.08, gT = 0, τw = τk = 0.25, sk = 0
σ τc τw τk sk sn welfare
0.2 0.03846 0.250 0.250 0.000 0.046 -141.335
0.3 0.03795 0.250 0.250 0.000 0.031 -140.330
0.4 0.03643 0.250 0.250 0.000 0.018 -139.329
0.5 0.03538 0.250 0.250 0.000 0.007 -138.326
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